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States requires a speedy trial.' ' 59 Whenever a collateral attack is made
upon a state proceeding alleging a denial of a speedy trial, the issue
would be whether the delay in trial under the circumstances so prejudiced the accused as to deny him his constitutional right to a fair trial.
This formula would permit the federal courts as umpires of the federal
system to apply a uniform test to all state and federal court proceedings. It would permit the federal courts to disregard a specific statutory
definition of a speedy trial or any peculiar state procedural rules in
the appropriate case. 60 It is sufficiently flexible to afford an accused
protection where he has been prejudiced by unreasonable delays even
in those states which have adopted the federal rules governing this
right to a speedy trial; and it also could be used consistently to provide
a collateral attack upon judgments of federal courts where necessary.
ARTHUR C.

GEHR

Recent Decisions on the Admissibility of Confessions
Supreme Court Review of State Convictions
In Taylor v. Alabama,1 decided June 21, the United States Supreme
Court once again sharply disagreed concerning its function in reviewing
state convictions obtained through confessions which had been allegedly
coerced. Taylor, a nineteen-year old negro, who had confessed to the rape
of a white girl, was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death. At the
trial and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which unanimously
affirmed the conviction, 2 he was represented by able counsel. Before the trial
Taylor told his counsel that he had not been mistreated in any way in
reference to the confession and at the trial made no attempt to repudiate
it. Nonetheless his lawyer diligently cross-examined the state's witnesses
concerning the voluntariness of the confession but was unable to uncover
any indication of coercion. After the unsuccessful appeal Taylor changed
his lawyers and for the first time attempted to attack the confession by
filing a petition in the state supreme court for permission to file a petition
in the trial court for writ of error coram nobis. 3 Alleging that the con59 United States v. McWilliams, 69 F. Supp. 812, 815 (Dist. Ct. D. C. 1947),
affirmed 163 F. (2d) 695 (App. D. C. 1947) cited supra note 11.
60 In United States ex rel. Hanson v. !agen the petitioner would not have
been entitled to relief on this formula. His trial commenced within twenty-five
days after the "Four Term" Act had run; the evidence permitted no question
of his guilt; there was no evidence of prejudice resulting from the not too burdensome delay; on the contrary, the petitioner conceivably may have been benefited by
the delay which might have permitted the high public tension to subside.

1 68 S. Ct. 1415.
2 Taylor v. State, 249 Ala. 130, 30 So. (2d) 256 (1947).
3 The writ of error coram nobis brings the error of fact directly before the trial
court. In Alabama where a conviction has been affirmed by a superior court, a
petitioner must secure permission of that court before he can file his petition for
writ of error coram nobis in the trial court. In the Taylor case the Supreme Court

expressly approved the Alabama procedure on the authority of Hysler v. Florida,
315 U.S. 411 (1942), which passed on a similar coram nobis procedure used in the
state of Florida. For additional information concerning coram nobis see the
comment entitled "Collateral Relief from Convictions in Violation of Due Process
in Illinois" (1947) 38 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 139, also printed in (1947) 42
Ill. L. Rev. 329. See also Comment (1937) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 644.
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fession had been induced by beatings and threats administered to him
while detained in jail, he attempted to explain his statement to his counsel
that he had not been mistreated on the grounds that he was "uneducated
and ignorant" and "fearful of further reprisals" by the police. The only
evidence in support of his allegations were affidavits of three persons who
had been in jail with him. One of them purported to have seen the beatings and all three alleged to have heard them. Moving to dismiss the
petition, the state filed an affidavit accompanied by eight photographs of
Taylor in the nude, which were taken on each of the days of his detention
after his arrest on June 29, 1946 and after his confession at 3 a.m. July 3.
With one dissent, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the petition,
saying, "We think it is asking entirely too much of the court to believe
that this defendant, in the secrecy of consultation with his own able
counsel, would say to counsel in substance that there was nothing upon
which to base an objection to his confessions, solely because he was under
he claims were accorded him on July
fear generated by treatment which
4
3, nearly four months previous.' '
The main issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether
the Supreme Court of Alabama, in denying Taylor's petition and thereby
refusing him a hearing de novo on the admissibility of the confession, had
deprived him of due process of law. The case also presented the broader
question of whether, after a.fair trial and an appeal, a state is under a
duty to grant another hearing to a defendant simply because he alleged
that he had been denied his constitutional rights. In an opinion by Mr.
Justice Burton, the Court held that the state court was not limited to the
allegations in the coram nobis petition but could conclude from an examination of the entire record that the averments of the petition were unreasonable and that there was no probability of truth contained therein.
After an exhaustive analysis of the evidence, the Court affirmed the judgment of the state court. Mr. Justice Murphy, with whom Mr. Justice
Douglas and Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred, dissented on the grounds
that, since the petition was reasonable on its face, due process required
that Taylor be given an opportunity to prove his allegations that the confession had been beaten out of him. 5 The dissenting opinion also represents the strong belief of those justices that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not so much concerned with the protection of
the innocent as with the imposition upon the states of civilized standards
of police administration. In the minds of those justices, "coerced confessions are outlawed by the due process clause regardless of the truth or
falsity of their content." 6
Both the dissenting opinion and a special concurring opinion by M1r.
Justice Frankfurter 7 pointed out that since Taylor had exhausted his state
4Ez parte Taylor, 249 Ala. 667, 670, 32 So. (2d) 659, 661 (1947).
5 68 S. Ct. 1415, 1425-1428.
6 d. at 1426.
7 Id. at 1424-1425. Mr. Justice Frankfurter felt it necessary to say, "The dissenting opinion is written as though this Court were a court of criminal appeals
for revision of convictions in the State courts. It is written as though we were
asked to consider independently, and as a revisory appellate tribunal which had
power to do so, whether a conviction in the courts of Alabama was based upon
,a coerced confession. One would hardly gather from the dissenting opinion that a
trial was had in Alabama under the best safeguards to which a defendant in our
courts is entitled; that he was defended by counsel concededly able who exerted
all his professional skill on behalf of his client; that the trial judge guided the
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remedies, the judgment of the Court was no bar against his filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court.
Admissibility of a Second Confession After a PriorOne
Had Been Obtained Through Force
Where a defendant's confession has been induced by force and where
he subsequently makes a "voluntary" confession, under what circumstances will the latter be deemed admissible? This question was recently
passed upon by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Holt v. State,5
where defendant had been convicted of burglarly and sentenced for a
term of five years. At the trial it was clearly established that after defendant was arrested at Port Arthur he was unmercifully whipped and
beaten until he confessed to some burglaries, whereupon he was taken to
another county where he repeated his confession to the sheriff there.
While admitting the beatings which preceded defendant's first confession
at Port Arthur, the state contended that the second confession was voluntary. Defendant, however, testified that the authorities at Port Arthur
"told me they were going to bring me over here, and if I did not sign a
confession they would take me over there (back to Port Arthur) and
finish me; they turned me over to the Sheriff here; and they said if I did
not sign a confession they would carry me back and give me some more,
and I would have signed anything." Since this testimony was not contradicted by the police authorities, the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the confession should not have been admitted under the rule "that
when a prior confession of an accused is obtained as a result of improper
influences, subsequent confessions will be received only when it is made
to appear that the improper influences exercised in obtaining the first
confession did not enter into or influence the making of the subsequent
confession.

',9

The Texas court in the Holt case applied the same test of admissibility
as is used by the United States Supreme Court' 0 and the courts of
other jurisdictions."- However, the Holt case did present a problem somewhat peculiar to Texas alone. Since the defendant in his second confession
had told the sheriff where he had hidden the stolen goods and had subsequently assisted the police authorities to recover them, the state attempted
proceedings with competence and scrupulosity; that then followed a careful review
of the trial on appeal, resulting in an affirmance of the judgment of conviction by
the highest court of Alabama."
For evidence that the Supreme Court of Alabama in an appropriate case will
reverse a conviction of a negro based upon a coerced confession, see the splendid
opinion of that court in Huntley v. State, 31 So. (2d) 216 (1948), discussed infra
note 11.
8208 S.W. (2d) 643 (1948).
9 Id. at 645.
10 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 603 (1944); United States v. Bayer, 331
U.S. 532 (1947).
, 34 So. (2d) 216 (1948), cited supra note 7,
11 In Huntley v. State, -Ala.a young white woman had been raped by a masked negro. The only information
that she could give the police was that the negro was apparently dressed in the
garb of a gasoline station attendant and that she had seen a man so dressed ride
past her house on a bicycle. Suspicion was directed at defendant who was arrested
at 6 o'clock that evening and lodged in the Pell City jail, where he underwent
much questioning. By midnight a lynch mob had gathered around the jail, had
placed a ladder which reached to his cell upstairs, and had fired some shots into
the jail. Defendant, who was hit and slightly injured in his arm and leg, was told
to lie down on the floor, was later sneaked down stairs, and by 1 o'clock was
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to invoke the rule previously applied in Texas'2 that a confession which is
obtained through force will be admitted if it is confirmed by other evidence such as the finding of stolen property. Probably under the pressure of the United States Supreme Court opinions, the Texas court rejected the state's contention and held that the statute13 incorporating this
rule "has no application when a confession is obtained as a result of the
infliction of physical or mental pain.' '14
Inroads Upon the " Civilized Standards" (McNabb Case) Rule
In 1943 the Supreme Court, in a famous opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in McNabb v. United States,15 announced for the first time that
the Court would exercise "the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence" in reference to the admission
of confessions in federal cases. "Such standards," Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal
historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as
'due process of law' and below which we reach what is really trial by
force." 16 Relying in part upon its duty of supervising the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts and in part upon a statutory requirement that persons under arrest should be taken "forthwith" before
a judicial officer, the Court there held that confessions, otherwise admistransferred by the Highway Patrol to the Birmingham jail. At Birmingham next
morning a patrolman by the name of White told defendant that everybody believed
that he had committed the crime and that "if he would tell the truth about it it
might be better for him, that he would not have to be gone so long." (The court'Is
language). Defendant then said he would confess. At 5 o'clock that afternoon
White again talked with defendant and prevailed upon him to sign a confession.
The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the defendant's first statement that he
would plead guilty had been induced by White's suggestion that he would get off
easier and by the terrifying experiences of the previous evening and that these
influences invalidated the later confession. "The rule is well established that where
a confession has been obtained, or inducement held out, under circumstances which
would render a confession inadmissible, a confession subsequently made is not
admissible in evidence, unless, from proper warning of the consequences, or from
other circumstances, there is reason to presume that the hope or fear, which influenced the first confession, is dispelled." Id. at 219.
Contra: Cooley
12 Greer v. State, 116 Tex. Cr. R. 491, 32 S.W. (2d) 845 (1930).
v. State, 158 S.W. (2d) 1014 (Tex. Cr. App., 1942).
13Art. 727, Code of Criminal Procedure, Vernon's Texas Statutes (1936).
14208 S.W. (2d) 643, 646. Accord, Cooley v. State, 158 S.W. (2d) 1014 (Tex.
Cr. App., 1942). The rule followed in most jurisdictions is that if, in consequence
of a confession otherwise invalid, facts are discovered which confirm the confession
in certain material respects, then the confirmed part of the confession is admissible,
State v. Garrison, 59 Ore. 440, 117 Pac. 657 (1911); Baughman v. Commonwealth,
206 Ky. 441, 267 S.W. 231 (1924); Patton v. State, 29 So. (2d) 96 (Miss., 1947);
Harris '. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 818, 193 S.W. (2d) 466 (1946); State v.
Cocklin, 109 Vt. 207, 194 Atl. 378 (1937).
Cf. Garcia v. State, 210 S.W. (2d) 574, 577 (Tex. Cr. App., 1948) (defendant
is not in position to complain of the admission into evidence of his written statement on the ground that it was not voluntarily made, when he has given practically
the same evidence from the witness box).
15 318 U.S. 332 (1943). For a comprehensive evaluation of the McNabb case see
Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2d. ed. 1948) 162-169. See also
Comment (1947) 38 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 136.
16 318 U.S. at 340. Mr. Justice Reed in a vigorous dissent said, "Now the Court
leaves undecided whether the present confessions are voluntary or involuntary and
declares that the confessions must be excluded because in addition to questioning
the petitioners, the arresting officers failed promptly to take them before a committing magistrate. The Court finds a basis for the declaration of this new rule of
evidence in its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice.
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sible, were rendered invalid by the failure of the officers to take the defendants before a committing magistrate prior to the long period of interrogation which preceded their confessions. Criticism of the opinion
by law enforcement officers, lower federal judges, and. Congressional 7committees lead to a retreat from the rule in United States v. Mitchell,' decided the following year. In the- Mitchell case, the Court held that the
McNabb rule did not apply to confessions made shortly after the arrest
and that prolonged illegal detention subsequent to the confession did not
retroactively invalidate the confession. The illegal detention under aggravating circumstances--" continuous questioning for many hours under
psychological pressure" 1 8 for the purpose of inducing the disclosureswere said to be the decisive features of the McNabb case.
Lower federal courts have had considerable difficulty in administering
the McNabb rule, even as modified by the Mitchell case. Recent opinions
of the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, indicate that
that court, at least, reads' the rule as bting no different from the standard
imposed by the Supreme Court in reviewing state convictions under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; namely, that the confession must not be obtained under circumstances which are "inherently
coercive."'I9 In Upshaw v. United States"0 the United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia, has recently passed upon a case very
similar to the supposed facts in the McNabb ease. 2 ' Upshaw was arrested
under suspicion of theft at 2 a.m. on Friday, June 6, 1947, and shortly
after 9 o'clock the next (Saturday) morning he confessed. He was not
taken before a committing magistrate until Monday, June 9. Upon the
appeal from Upshaw's conviction, the' government attorneys filed a
written confession of error and conceded that the confession was inadmissible. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the confession was
valid and affirmed the conviction. "A confession voluntarily given is admissible in evidence," the court said. "We do22not read the McNabb and
and Mitchell cases, and the recent Haley case, as holding otherwise. "23
Relying upon the Mitchell case, the court held that Upshaw's confession
was not "induced by illegal detention." The Supreme Court has granted
I question whether this offers to the trial courts and the peace officers a rule of
admissibility as clear as the test- of the voluntary character of the confession.
I am opposed to broadening the possibilities of defendants escaping punishment
by these more rigorous technical requirements in the administration of justice. If
these confessions are otherwise voluntary, civilized standards, in my opinion, are
not. advanced by setting aside these judgments because of acts of omission which
are not shown to have tended towards coercing the admissions." Id. at 349.
17 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
18 Id. at 67, 70.
19 The Iinherent coercion" formula in regard to state convictions was first
announced in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
20 168 F. (2d) 167 (1948).
21 Actually in the MoNabb case defendants had been promptly arraigned, but the
trial court record did not disclose that fact and the Supreme Court assumed that
there had been a violation of the arraignment statute. In a petition for a rehearing,
the government brought the fact of arraignment to the Court's attention, but to
mo avail. The conviction of the McNabbs upon their second trial was affirmed, 142
7. (2d) 904 (C.C.C. 6th, 1944).
22 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (editor's footnote). The case was briefly
noted in a recent issue of this journal, (February-March 1948) 38 J. Crin. L. &
Criminology.
23 168 F. (2d) 167. In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Edgerton disagreed with
the majority that the ease was distinguishable from the Mitch4ll case and contended that Upshaw's confession fell within the ban of that case forbidding an
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certiorari2 4 and will have an opportunity next term to reexamine the
rules governing the admissibility of confessions in federal cases. One can
at least hope that the Court will rephrase is troublsome "civilized
standards" rule in the terms of the familiar test that a confession will not
be admitted which was obtained under circumstances which would indicate that it was untrustworthy. However much one might sympathize
with the attention which the Court devotes to "psychological factors" in
confession cases, these factors might well be brought within the traditional
trustworthiness test: that is, whenever a defendant confesses under inducements or pressures which might have led him, even if innocent, to
confess, the confession should not be admitted.
In line with most state courts which have had occasion to pass upon the
McNabb rule, 25 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held that the
McNabb case was limited to the federal courts and would not be applied to
state cases. In Commonwealth v. Turner,2 6 that court held that detention
by defendant for five days and interrogation each day by police officers
before he was taken before a magistrate or allowed an opportunity to consult with counsel did not invalidate the confession. "Any method of
extracting confessions by means which would cause a prisoner to falsely
confess guilt in order to be relieved of unendurable immediate suffering
will not be tolerated in any civilized state. On the other hand, for a court
to hold that a confession made by a well fed and decently cared for
prisoner after he has been held in custody a few days without counsel or
contact with friends and after he has been questioned a few hours every
day by police officers in reference to a crime of which he is suspected, is
inadmissible as being a coerced confession would be unrealistic and impractical.. . . In the unending warfare between the criminal and society
a due regard for the latter's safety requires that officers should have a
reasonable time within which to interrogate an accused while he is in
their custody and being fairly treated and without their efforts to elicit
the truth being frustrated by persons interested
in saving criminals from
27
the just consequences of their crimes."

PETER A. DAMxmNN
"inexcusable detention for the purpose of illegally extracting evidence," United
States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 67 (1944). To meet the argument of the majority
that Upshaw had not contended that the confession had been induced by 'the
detention and prolonged questioning, the dissenting opinion pointed out that
"nothing suggests that the confession would have been obtained if the illegal
detention had not occurred." 168 F. (2d) 167, 169, 170.
The Upshaw case is a logical culmination of several recent opinions by the same
court which indicated its disinclination to apply the rule of the McNabb and Mitclwl
cases literally: Boone v. United States, 164 F. (2d) 102, 103 (1947); Wheeler v.
United States, 165 F. (2d) 225, 229-230 (1947); and Alderman v. United States,
165 F. (2d) 622, 623 (1947).
24 Upshaw v. United States, 68 S. Ct. 1505 (1948).
25 State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 178 S.W. (2d) 77 (1944); People v. McFarland, 386 Ill. 122, 53 N.E. (2d) 884 (1944); State v. Smith, 158 Kan. 645, 149 Pac.
(2d) 600 (1944); State v. Lawder, 147 Ohio 530, 72 N.E. (2d) 785 (1946); State
v. Sandord, 193 S.W. (2d) 35 (Mo., 1946); Fry v. State, 147 Pac. (2d) 803 (Okla.,
1944); Foster v. State, 152 Pac. (2d) 929 (Okla., 1944); and McGhee v. State,
183 Tenn. 26, 189 S.W. (2d) 826 (1945).
2658 A. (2d) 61 (1948).
27 Id. at 68. The court quoted extensively from 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d. ed.
1940) 318, 319 which takes the view that lengthy interrogation in seclusion, immediately after arrest, in many instances is a necessary part of law enforcement.

